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People constantly assign a value to stimuli and out-
comes around them. These evaluation processes under-
lie “hot” aspects of cognition such as motivation, 
emotion, and affect. In a variety of psychopathologies, 
impairments in evaluation processes are critical. For 
example, pathologically anxious individuals (e.g., 
arachnophobic patients) attribute an excessive negative 
value to certain stimuli (e.g., spiders; Lang et al., 1998). 
People experiencing depression evaluate a multiplicity 
of aspects of their life as gloomy (Smith, 2013). Addic-
tion leads to an overwhelming desire for consuming 
drugs (Robinson & Berridge, 2001). Hence, understand-
ing how impairments in evaluation might contribute to 
psychopathology is paramount for research. Inspired 
by seminal studies in prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), contemporary models of evaluation 
highlight its reference-dependent nature (Koszegi & 
Rabin, 2006; Louie et al., 2013, 2015; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli, 
Friston, et al., 2016; N. Stewart, 2009; N. Stewart et al., 
2006; Woodford, 2012): When attributing a value to an 
outcome, the brain automatically assesses the outcome 
not in isolation but relative to its context. For example, 
consider an individual who is purchasing a house and 
who discovers that the price of the house is £10 more 
than expected. Compare this with someone paying for 
a coffee and realizing that the price is £10 more than 
expected. Although objectively both individuals experi-
ence an equivalent unforeseen extra cost of £10, we would 
expect the second person to be way more upset than the 
first. This example stresses the idea that evaluation is 
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Abstract
Evaluation (the process attributing value to outcomes) underlies “hot” aspects of cognition, such as emotion, affect, 
and motivation. In several psychopathologies, such as depression and addiction, impairments in evaluation are critical. 
Contemporary theories highlight the reference-dependent nature of evaluation, whereby outcomes are evaluated 
relative to their context. Surprisingly, reference-dependent evaluation remains to be explored in the context of 
psychopathology. We offer a computational theory of how impaired reference-dependent evaluation might underlie 
mental illness. The theory proposes that evaluation derives from comparing an outcome against a reference point 
parameter and by weighting any discrepancy by an uncertainty parameter. Maladaptive evaluation is proposed to occur 
when these parameters do not reflect the true context statistics. Depending on which parameter is altered, different 
forms of maladaptive evaluation emerge, each associated with specific clinical conditions. This model highlights how 
the concept of reference-dependent evaluation can elucidate several clinical conditions, including perfectionism, 
depression, and addiction.
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reference-dependent—the subjective value of outcomes 
strongly depends on the context in which these out-
comes are experienced (analogous phenomena have 
been reported in the social domain in monkeys; 
 Brosnan & De Waal, 2003; this hints to the fact that, in 
evolutionary terms, reference dependency might be the 
product of a tendency for social comparison expressed 
by animals living in complex social groups).
Given the central role of evaluation in psychopathol-
ogy and the central role of reference effects in evalua-
tion, exploring reference effects in the context of 
psychopathology appears as a promising research ave-
nue. What are the implications of reference-dependent 
models for the development and maintenance of psy-
chopathology? Can reference-dependent models shed 
light on important psychopathological processes? To 
date, these questions remain open. In this article, we 
aim to develop a theoretical framework that applies 
reference-dependent models of evaluation to psy-
chopathology. First, following recent literature, we 
describe a general computational model of evaluation 
(Rigoli, 2019; Woodford, 2012); we refer to this as the 
reference-dependent model of psychopathology 
(RDMP). Next, adopting this as framework, we exam-
ine how aberrant evaluation could arise in psychopa-
thology. At the same time, the link between our 
approach and key concepts in clinical literature are 
highlighted, allowing us to shed new light on these 
concepts.
The Model
In contemporary literature, three perspectives debate 
on how reference-dependent evaluation works. First, 
divisive normalization models propose that reference-
dependent evaluation emerges because reward sensitiv-
ity decreases when previous outcomes are highly 
valuable (Louie et al., 2013, 2015). Second, decision by 
sampling postulates that previous experiences are sam-
pled from memory and compared with the current out-
come, resulting in reference-dependent evaluation (N. 
Stewart, 2009; N. Stewart et al., 2006). Third, expectation-
as-reference accounts propose that reference-dependent 
evaluation arises because previous experiences set 
expectations to which outcomes are compared (Koszegi 
& Rabin, 2006; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli, Friston, et al., 2016; 
Woodford, 2012); the RDMP relies on this latter approach. 
However, we do not aim at comparing the three 
approaches (for a detailed overview and comparison, 
see Rigoli, 2019) but at highlighting their similarity: All 
share the key principle that outcomes are evaluated 
considering the environmental statistics, with analogous 
implications for mental illness.
To introduce the RDMP, consider an environment in 
which a set of stimuli (e.g., money) can be experienced, 
each associated with a raw value (e.g., a monetary 
amount). For each stimulus, the calculation of the sub-
jective value VR associated with the raw value R depends 












This prescribes that the subjective value of a stimulus 
is 0 < VR < 1. The parameters µ and σ (being σ > 0) are 
the reference point and the uncertainty, respectively 
(Fig. 1). These parameters capture the reference-depen-
dent nature of evaluation: The subjective value, which 
is experienced at a subjective level and drives behavior, 
is not equivalent to the raw value, but it depends on 
some reference information. The RDMP proposes that 
subjective value can be experienced as either reward 
or punishment, occurring when VR > 0.5 and VR < 0.5, 
respectively (a neutral experience occurs when VR = 
0.5). According to this definition, reward is experienced 
when R > µ, and punishment is experienced when R < 
µ. Therefore, the reference point can be interpreted as 
the standard (or expectation) to which outcomes are 
compared and are evaluated as reward (i.e., better than 
the standard) or as punishment (i.e., worse than the 
standard; Fig. 1a). For example, the reference point µ 
might indicate the standard mark at school, implying 
that a better mark will be perceived as success and a 
worse mark as failure. The parameter σ can be inter-
preted as the level of uncertainty about the own stan-
dard, prescribing how much a discrepancy from the 
reference point will be weighted (Fig. 1b). In other 
words, it determines how subjectively good or bad an 
outcome is when compared with the reference point. 
For example, if one has received a mark above/below 
the standard, the uncertainty parameter determines how 
subjectively good/bad the mark is. If there is high 
uncertainty, then a discrepancy will not be weighted 
much, minimizing the subjective distance from the ref-
erence point (Fig. 1b). Hence, the mark above/below 
the standard will not be considered too good/bad. Con-
versely, if there is low uncertainty, a discrepancy will be 
weighted heavily, maximizing the subjective distance from 
the reference point (Fig. 1b). Hence, the mark above/
below the standard will be considered as very good/bad.
In short, thanks to the reference point µ and the 
uncertainty parameter σ, the RDMP highlights the ref-
erence-dependent nature of subjective value. Below, 
we explore how critical characteristics of psychopathol-
ogy can be interpreted within the framework.
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Implications for Psychopathology
Consider an example of a context in which an agent can 
experience seven possible raw values (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60, and 70), each with equal probability. The RDMP 
model suggests that within this context, adaptive evalu-
ation (Fig. 2a) occurs if the reference point µ corre-
sponds to the contextual average (40 in this example) 
and the uncertainty parameter σ corresponds to the 
contextual standard deviation (20 in this example; 
Rigoli, 2019). In other words, adaptive evaluation occurs 
when an agent has a realistic representation of the 
context and its statistics and uses this representation to 
evaluate each stimulus appropriately relative to the oth-
ers. Applying Equation 1 with µ = 40 and σ = 20 (reflect-
ing the true context statistics), the subjective value of 
the different raw values corresponds to 0.1824, 0.2689, 
0.3775, 0.5, 0.6225, 0.7311, and 0.8176, respectively 
(Table 1). Conversely, when the reference point µ and 
the uncertainty parameter σ do not reflect the true 
context statistics, evaluation is considered as maladap-
tive by the RDMP.
We propose that this maladaptive evaluation might 
explain important features of psychopathology. Below, 
we consider the two forms of maladaptive evaluation 
ensuing from the RDMP model (associated with altered 
reference point µ and altered uncertainty parameter σ, 
respectively), and we examine them in the context of 
psychopathology. Next, we analyze the processes lead-
ing to alterations of the model parameters, again explor-
ing their link with psychopathology.
Reference point
According to the RDMP, a case of maladaptive evalua-
tion derives from a reference point µ that does not 
reflect the average of the contextual distribution but is 
higher or lower than the average. We first explore the 
case in which the reference point is higher than the 
contextual average. The example above (describing a 
context characterized by raw values 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60, and 70) can be examined, but now adopting a refer-
ence point µ that is higher than the average (in our 
example, higher than 40; the uncertainty parameter σ 
is still equal to 20). We consider two different instances 
because each can shed light on different aspects of 
psychopathology. First, the reference point µ might be 
high but not extreme (inside the range of the contextual 
distribution); in our example, it is equal to 70. Second, 
the reference point µ might be extremely high (outside 
the range of the contextual distribution), in our exam-
ple equal to 100. Below, we explore each case and its 
relevance for psychopathology.
We first consider the case in which the reference 
point µ is equal to 70 (i.e., high but not extreme; see 
Fig. 2b and Tables 1 and 2). When comparing the results 
for µ = 40 and µ = 70, two key differences emerge. First, 
all subjective values are lower when µ = 70 (Table 1). 
In other words, a high reference point will lead to con-
sidering all possible outcomes as more negative. The 
second aspect concerns the distance in subjective value 
among outcomes that are adjacent in the distribution 
(e.g., 20 minus 10, or 30 minus 20, or 40 minus 30, etc.; 
µ = 20 
µ = 30 
µ = 40 
µ = 50
R R
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Fig. 1. Role played by the model parameters. (a) Subjective value is graphed as a function of raw value for different values of reference 
point µ (σ = 20 for all lines). (b) Subjective value is graphed as a function of raw value for different values of uncertainty parameter 
σ (µ = 35 for all lines).
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Table 2). When the reference point µ is equal to the 
contextual average (in our example, µ = 40), this dis-
tance is maximal near the average (in our example, it 
is maximal for 40 minus 30 and for 50 minus 40; Table 
1). Conversely, when the reference point µ is high (in 
our example, µ = 70), this distance is maximal for a 
region above the average (in our example, it is maximal 
for 70 minus 60; Table 1). Moreover, in the lower tail 
of the contextual distribution, distances among adjacent 
outcomes are larger when the reference point is close 
to the contextual average compared with when it is 
high. In our example, for 20 minus 10, 30 minus 20, 40 
minus 30, and 50 minus 40, the distance in subjective 
value is larger when µ = 40 compared with when µ = 
70. In short, when comparing a reference point close 
to the contextual average with a high reference point, 
the distance for adjacent outcomes is larger, except for 
a region at the high end of the distribution.
We argue that this scenario might help explaining 
important phenomena in psychopathology. Several 
clinical conditions, such as eating disorders, obsessive 
compulsive disorders, social anxiety, and depression, 
are associated with both perfectionism and dichoto-
mous thinking (Burns & Fedewa, 2005; Byrne et  al., 
2004; Egan et  al., 2007, 2011; Flett & Hewitt, 2002). 
Moreover, perfectionism and dichotomous thinking are 
µ = 40, σ = 20 µ = 40, σ = 20 
µ = 70, σ = 20 
µ = 40, σ = 20
µ = 0, σ = 20
µ = 40, σ = 20
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Fig. 2. Subjective value as a function of raw value for different parameter sets. 
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themselves correlated (Burns & Fedewa, 2005; Egan 
et  al., 2007). Perfectionism occurs when all possible 
outcomes are considered as negative except for only 
those at the very high end of the distribution (Egan 
et al., 2007, 2011; Flett & Hewitt, 2002). Moreover, even 
these outcomes at the top are usually experienced not 
with positive feelings but with just a sense of relief. For 
example, the top mark at school might not be perceived 
as a great achievement to be celebrated but simply as 
the minimum to be expected. This picture of perfection-
ism fits with the scenario described by the RDMP in 
which a high reference point is implemented. In our 
example, all outcomes are evaluated as negative (i.e., 
they have a subjective value smaller than 0.5) except 
for the outcome of 70, which is associated with a neu-
tral value (equal to 0.5). This scenario captures the 
notion that in perfectionism expectations (captured by 
the reference point µ) are too high, resulting in disap-
pointment (when the outcome is worse than expecta-
tions) or, at best, in relief (when the outcome matches 
expectations).
Dichotomous thinking occurs when possible out-
comes are grouped in two opposing categories (Byrne 
et al., 2004). Moreover, dichotomous thinking is char-
acterized by polarization; it maximizes the perceived 
distance among categories of outcomes and minimizes 
the distance within each category (Byrne et al., 2004). 
This picture of dichotomous thinking also fits with the 
scenario described by the RDMP in which a high refer-
ence point is implemented. In our example, comparing 
the condition in which µ = 70 with the condition in 
which µ = 40, the difference in subjective value is mini-
mized for 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60; in other words, 
these outcomes are perceived as more similar (Table 
2). Hence, the RDMP predicts that a high reference 
point will group these outcomes together. At the same 
time, comparing the condition in which µ = 70 with the 
condition in which µ = 40, the distance between 60 and 
70 is enhanced: These outcomes are perceived as more 
far apart (Table 2). Therefore, in line with the notion 
of dichotomous thinking, the RDMP predicts that a high 
reference point groups the outcomes of 10, 20, 30, 40, 
50, and 60 together while treating the outcome of 70 
as a separate category. Altogether, when a high refer-
ence point is implemented in the RDMP, perfectionism 
and dichotomous thinking both emerge. Thus, the 
RDMP offers a formal description of perfectionism and 
dichotomous thinking and explains why these are com-
monly observed together empirically (Burns & Fedewa, 
2005; Egan et al., 2007).
The scenario of a high reference point might shed 
light also on addiction. Similar to the RDMP, influential 
models of addiction (Koob, 1999; Koob & Le Moal, 
2001, 2008; Sterling, 2012) maintain that subjective 
value derives from comparing an outcome with a set 
point (although they do not postulate any uncertainty 
parameter). According to these models, repeated drug 
consumption would overincrease the set point, leading 
to both tolerance and withdrawal: The same drug dose 
would lead to a decreased subjective value (tolerance), 
and abstinence would lead to a very unpleased state 
(withdrawal). Moreover, according to set-point models 
(Koob, 1999; Koob & Le Moal, 2001, 2008; Sterling, 
2012), an overincrease in set point would explain why, 
once addiction has established, natural incentives such 
as food or social interactions lose their appeal: They 
would pale in comparison with the newly established 
set point. A similar argument ensues from the RDMP. 
In our example, imagine that drug consumption is asso-
ciated with a raw value of 70, no drug consumption 
with a raw value of 30, and the reference point is µ = 
40. We can also consider natural incentives such as food 
and social interaction as associated with raw values of 
40 and 50, respectively. In this context, drug consump-
tion would lead to a highly pleasurable experience (VR = 
0.8176) and no drug consumption to a slightly negative 
experience (VR = 0.3775; Table 1). Food and social 
interaction would be experienced as neutral (VR = 0.5) 
and pleasant (VR = 0.6225), respectively. Repeated drug 
use, associated with an increased frequency of exces-
sively pleasurable experiences, would eventually boost 
the reference point to µ = 70, resulting in addiction. 
Table 1. Subjective Value (VR) of Outcomes for Different Parameter Sets
Outcome 
(raw value)
µ = 40, 
σ = 20
µ = 70, 
σ = 20
µ = 100, 
σ = 20
µ = 0,  
σ = 20
µ = 40,  
σ = 10
µ = 40, 
σ = 40
10 0.1824 0.0474 0.0110 0.6225 0.0474 0.3208
20 0.2689 0.0759 0.0180 0.7311 0.1192 0.3775
30 0.3775 0.1192 0.0293 0.8176 0.2689 0.4378
40 0.5000 0.1824 0.0474 0.8808 0.5000 0.5000
50 0.6225 0.2689 0.0759 0.9241 0.7311 0.5622
60 0.7311 0.3775 0.1192 0.9526 0.8808 0.6225
70 0.8176 0.5000 0.1824 0.9707 0.9526 0.6792
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This would imply that consuming the same drug dose 
becomes no more pleasurable (VR = 0.5; analogous to 
tolerance) and that not consuming any drug becomes 
highly unpleasant (VR = 0.1192; analogous to with-
drawal). Food (VR = 0.1824) and social interaction (VR = 
0.2689) would now both become unpleasant. These are 
analogous to predictions of set-points models (Koob, 
1999; Koob & Le Moal, 2001, 2008; Sterling, 2012).
However, the RDMP adds another aspect not con-
sidered by standard set-point models: It predicts that a 
reference point increase (caused by repeated drug con-
sumption) will affect the distances among outcomes 
(Table 2). According to the RDMP, before addiction (i.e., 
when µ = 40), the distance between drug consumption 
and social interaction is 0.8176 – 0.6225 = 0.1951, 
whereas once addiction has established (i.e., when µ = 
70), it increases to 0.5 – 0.2689 = 0.2311. In other words, 
the RDMP predicts that once addiction has developed, 
the value of drug consumption compared with natural 
incentives (e.g., social interaction) will be magnified; 
set-point models do not make such prediction. More-
over, before addiction (i.e., when µ = 40), the distance 
between food and social interaction is 0.1225, whereas 
once addiction has established (i.e., when µ = 70), it 
decreases to 0.0865. Likewise, before addiction (i.e., 
when µ = 40), the distance between food and no drug 
consumption is 0.1225, whereas once addiction has 
established (i.e., when µ = 70), it decreases to 0.0632. 
In other words, the RDMP predicts that once addiction 
has developed, different natural incentives will all be 
perceived as rather similar, leading to an indiscriminate 
affective response: The ability to discriminate among 
outcomes, and to choose accordingly, will be impaired. 
This RDMP prediction, absent in set-point theories, fits 
with empirical observations showing that individuals 
with addiction exhibit a similar level of disinterest for 
incentives besides the drug (Hatzigiakoumis et al., 2011; 
Leventhal et al., 2014).
We now consider the case in which the reference 
point µ is extremely high (outside the range of the 
contextual distribution), in our example equal to 100 
(see Fig. 2c and Tables 1 and 2). Here all subjective 
values are experienced as punishments (i.e., they have 
subjective value lower than 0.5) and are more negative 
compared with when µ = 40 or µ = 70 (Table 1). More-
over, the distance in subjective value among adjacent 
outcomes is very small (the largest being equal to 
0.0433; Table 2), implying that different outcomes are 
perceived as rather similar, leading to an indiscriminate 
(and highly negative) affective response to all of them. 
We argue that this scenario is appropriate to describe 
the affective processes characterizing depression. In 
line with this scenario, people suffering from depres-
sion feel severely negative affect independent of the 
outcome they experience (Rottenberg, 2005). Even 
objectively positive outcomes do not alter the negative 
affect felt by these people (anhedonia; Pizzagalli, 2014). 
Moreover, several studies have reported that depres-
sion, especially when severe, is characterized by 
decreased emotional discrimination (i.e., an emotional 
response expressed both at the behavioral and physi-
ological levels that is similar for both salient and neutral 
stimuli; Bylsma et al., 2008; Rottenberg, 2017; Rottenberg 
et al., 2005; Rottenberg & Johnson, 2007). This observa-
tion fits with the scenario described by the RDMP in 
which the reference point µ is extremely high: As we 
have just demonstrated, in this scenario different out-
comes elicit a very similar affective response despite 
the outcomes being objectively very different. Note that 
the two characteristics of depression that (a) outcomes 
elicit negative affect and (b) outcomes elicit indiscrimi-
nate emotional responses both ensue naturally from 
the RDMP, without any further assumption.
Altogether, a large reference point µ is postulated in 
perfectionism (combined with dichotomous thinking), 
addiction, and (in the extreme case) depression. How 
does the RDMP integrate these concepts? Perfectionism 
and addiction are conceptually analogous: Both imply 
disdain of virtually all stimuli except one—the very top 
outcome and the addictive substance for perfectionism 
Table 2. Difference in Subjective Value (VR) Between Adjacent Outcomes 




µ = 40, 
σ = 20
µ = 70, 
σ = 20
µ = 100, 
σ = 20
µ = 0,  
σ = 20
µ = 40, 
σ = 10
µ = 40, 
σ = 40
20 – 10 0.0865 0.0285 0.0070 0.1086 0.0718 0.0567
30 – 20 0.1086 0.0433 0.0113 0.0865 0.1497 0.0603
40 – 30 0.1225 0.0632 0.0181 0.0632 0.2311 0.0622
50 – 40 0.1225 0.0865 0.0285 0.0433 0.2311 0.0622
60 – 50 0.1086 0.1086 0.0433 0.0285 0.1497 0.0603
70 – 60 0.0865 0.1225 0.0632 0.0181 0.0718 0.0567
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and addiction, respectively. However, the fact that these 
stimuli (the very top outcome and the addictive sub-
stance) are unrelated implies that perfectionism and 
addiction are ultimately very different conditions. 
Regarding depression, the RDMP associates a higher 
reference point to this pathology compared with per-
fectionism and addiction: During depression, nothing 
(not even the top outcome or the substance) appears 
as positive or even neutral. However, some features of 
perfectionism and addiction as depicted by the RDMP 
(e.g., the fact that most events are experienced as nega-
tive) fit with the diagnosis of depression found in clini-
cal manuals (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
In other words, within the RDMP, the concept of depres-
sion is, strictly speaking, different from perfectionism 
and addiction; however, perfectionism and addiction 
exhibit features consistent with the standard diagnosis 
of depression. This is in line with observations of a 
comorbidity between depression and addiction (Grant 
& Harford, 1995; evidence indicates that depression can 
ensue from addiction and often disappears after detoxi-
fication, Brown & Schuckit, 1988) and of a link between 
depression and perfectionism (Flett & Hewitt, 2002).
Finally, according to the RDMP, maladaptive evalua-
tion occurs when the reference point µ is lower than 
the average of the contextual distribution, in our exam-
ple when the reference point is equal to 0 (see Fig. 2d 
and Tables 1 and 2). Here, the pattern is symmetrical 
to when the reference point is larger than the average. 
Now, all subjective values are experienced as reward 
(i.e., they have subjective value higher than 0.5) and 
are more positive compared with when µ = 40, µ = 70, 
or µ = 100 (Table 1). Moreover, in comparison with 
when µ = 40 (i.e., equal to the contextual distribution), 
the distance in subjective value among adjacent out-
comes is smaller, implying that different outcomes are 
perceived as more similar, leading to a less discriminate 
affective response (Table 2). Regarding mental health, 
this scenario fits with the affective experience observed 
in mania. In line with this scenario, empirical evidence 
shows that patients with mania exhibit more positive 
emotional responses when exposed to negative, neu-
tral, or positive stimuli (Gruber et  al., 2008; Johnson 
et  al., 2005; Lennox et  al., 2004; Meyer et  al., 2001). 
Whether their ability to discriminate among outcomes 
is also impaired, as predicted by this scenario, remains 
to be explored empirically.
In conclusion, the RDMP proposes that alterations 
of the reference point, either upward or downward 
compared with the contextual average, lead to mal-
adaptive evaluation. Conditions of altered reference 
point as described by the RDMP have remarkable analo-
gies with a variety of clinical conditions characterized 
by abnormal affective processes, including perfection-
ism, dichotomous thinking, addiction, depression, and 
mania. These analogies suggest that the RDMP might 
contribute to explain affective impairments observed 
in these clinical conditions. In essence, according to 
the RDMP, changes in the reference point have two 
implications: (a) They determine whether outcomes are 
perceived as more or less positive, and (b) they impair 
the ability to discriminate among outcomes. We stress 
that this picture goes beyond standard theories (e.g., 
the set-point model of addiction; Koob, 1999; Koob & 
Le Moal, 2001, 2008; Sterling, 2012) that focus exclu-
sively on one of the implications of the RDMP (e.g., the 
set-point model explains only whether outcomes are 
perceived as more or less positive but not why discrimi-
nating abilities are impaired). Below, we explore the 
implications of the RDMP for psychopathology in the 
case of an altered uncertainty parameter σ.
Uncertainty parameter
Even when the reference point describes the contextual 
average accurately, according to the RDMP maladaptive 
evaluation occurs when the uncertainty parameter σ is 
altered (i.e., it is larger or smaller than the contextual 
standard deviation). We first focus on an uncertainty 
parameter σ smaller than the contextual standard devia-
tion. Consider the example above (describing a context 
characterized by raw values 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, and 
70; note that the actual SD = 20), but now with an 
uncertainty parameter σ equal to 10 (see Fig. 3a and 
Tables 1 and 2; note that the reference point µ is still 
equal to 40, correctly reflecting the contextual average). 
Comparing the case in which σ = 10 and the case in 
which σ = 20, every time a reward (i.e., when VR > 0.5) 
is experienced in one case, it is also experienced in the 
other case; likewise, every time a punishment (i.e., 
when VR < 0.5) is experienced in one case, it is also 
experienced in the other case (Table 1). In addition, 
contrary to cases in which the reference point µ changes 
(see above), on average subjective values for the out-
comes are equivalent in these two cases. However, 
comparing the case in which σ = 10 with the case in 
which σ = 20, the distance in subjective value among 
adjacent outcomes is magnified near the contextual 
average (40), and it is minimized far from the average 
(i.e., for 20 – 10 and for 70 – 60; Table 2). The case 
described by the RDMP in which σ is excessively small 
has analogies with clinical conditions characterized by 
exaggerated emotional sensitivity for both negative and 
positive stimuli, such as in borderline personality dis-
order. An influential proposal (Herpertz et al., 1997; Line-
han, 1993; Lynch et al., 2006) is that patients suffering 
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from this disorder exhibit intense affective reactions even 
when exposed to mild events (although empirical testing 
of this has produced mix findings; see Rosenthal et al., 
2008). According to this proposal, these patients would 
experience exaggerated negative emotions in response 
to mildly negative stimuli as well as exaggerated overen-
thusiasm when something mildly positive occurs. This 
idea is consistent with the scenario offered by the RDMP 
when the uncertainty parameter σ is small.
We now examine the case in which the uncertainty 
parameter is higher than the contextual standard devia-
tion, in our example σ = 40 (see Fig. 3b and Tables 1 
and 2). Comparing the case in which σ = 40 with the 
case in which σ = 20 (i.e., reflecting the actual standard 
deviation), every time a reward (i.e., when VR > 0.5) is 
experienced in one case, it is also experienced in the 
other case; likewise, every time a punishment (i.e., 
when VR < 0.5) is experienced in one case, it is also 
experienced in the other case (Table 1). In addition, 
contrary to cases in which the reference point µ changes 
(see above), on average subjective values for the out-
comes are equivalent in these two cases. However, 
comparing the case in which σ = 40 with the case in 
which σ = 20, the distance in subjective value among 
adjacent outcomes is much smaller (the largest being 
equal to 0.0632; Table 2). In other words, when the 
uncertainty parameter is large, affective experiences are 
predicted to be attenuated, or very close to a neutral 
evaluation (i.e., when VR = 0.5, associated with R = µ). 
Regarding psychopathology, this scenario fits with the 
concept of apathy (Marin, 1991, 1996; Starkstein & 
Leentjens, 2008). Apathy, defined as lack of motivation 
associated with numbed emotional responses, is com-
mon in a variety of disorders, including schizophrenia, 
dementia, Parkinson’s disease, and damage of the fron-
tal lobes (Marin, 1996). Note that this account of apathy 
excludes conditions, such as depression or anxiety, in 
which inactivity results from strong avoidance motiva-
tion and from intense emotions (e.g., depressed 
patients may staunchly resist treatment or socializa-
tion; Levy et al., 1998; Marin, 1996). Inactivity exhib-
ited by people affected by apathy is passive and 
compliant, reflecting poor motivation and numbed 
emotion. The RDMP offers a formal interpretation of 
apathy as arising from a large uncertainty parameter 
σ, leading to perception of all outcomes as similar and 
as rather neutral. This inability to discriminate among 
outcomes would explain why motivation is poor and 
emotions are numbed.
In short, the RDMP proposes that maladaptive evalu-
ation might derive not only from an altered reference 
point but also from an altered uncertainty parameter. 
This allows the model to account for conditions, such 
as excessive emotional sensitivity in borderline patients 
and apathy, that cannot be explained by an altered 
reference point. Below, we explore the processes lead-
ing to alterations in the model parameters and to mal-
adaptive evaluation.
Etiology of maladaptive evaluation
A fundamental research question is where the reference 
point and the uncertainty parameter come from and 
why these sometimes become altered. This fundamental 
µ = 40, σ = 20
µ = 40, σ = 40
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Fig. 3. Subjective value as a function of raw value for different parameter sets.
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question remains largely open because research on 
how context parameters for evaluation develop is in its 
infancy (Rigoli et al., 2018). However, it is helpful to 
discuss some general processes that are likely to be at 
play, focusing on four factors: genetic influences, direct 
learning, social influence, and drug-related effects.
First, genetic factors are arguably critical in affecting 
the parameters of the model underlying evaluation. For 
example, the brain is hardwired to perceive some stim-
uli as painful, and pain is normally perceived as pun-
ishment. These innate constraints are arguably critical 
in shaping the model parameters. Genetic factors are 
also likely to contribute to individual differences in 
these parameters, for example as reflected in child tem-
perament (Saudino, 2005). In other words, a propensity 
for entertaining lower or higher reference points or 
lower or higher uncertainty parameters might emerge 
at least partially as a genetic trait.
Second, parameters derive, at least partially, from 
direct experience with salient stimuli in different envi-
ronments or contexts. Substantial evidence has shown 
that experience in childhood and adolescence is critical 
in determining an adult’s predisposition to mental ill-
ness (e.g., Aas et al., 2016; Mandelli et al., 2015). Within 
the RDMP, one can attempt to explain this by relying on 
the notion that the model parameters reflect the statistics 
of the environment experienced early in life, which are 
then translated to adulthood largely unchanged. Hence, 
early exposure to an unhealthy environment would 
develop altered parameters that are at play also in 
adulthood. However, this explanation fits poorly with 
empirical data showing that early traumatic events pre-
dispose adults to depression (Mandelli et  al., 2015): 
This explanation predicts that traumatic events should 
lead to an excessively low reference point µ, whereas 
depression would be characterized by an excessively 
high reference point µ (see above). However, an alter-
native explanation also arises from the RDMP. This 
explanation argues that early life experience is not so 
much important in affecting the model parameters but, 
rather, in establishing the learning rate (which deter-
mines how the parameters change with novel experi-
ence). In human experience, the environment changes 
continuously, and tracking change requires updating 
the model parameters with an appropriate learning rate 
(a detailed account of how the learning rate develops 
will not be pursued here but is left for future work—see 
previous literature for some insight on this; Behrens 
et al., 2007; Browning et al., 2015). An excessively large 
or small learning rate results in altered parameters. An 
excessively small learning rate might result in an inabil-
ity to flexibly tune to the environment. This might char-
acterize forms of depression following bereavement 
(Clayton, 1990), during which a person is unable to 
“learn” that the environment is now worse than before 
and to reset subjective values accordingly, resulting in 
depression. An excessively large learning rate might 
result in parameters that are unstable even when the 
environment does not change, leading to dramatic 
mood swings, such as in bipolar disorder (where an 
extremely high reference point, conducive of depres-
sion, rapidly alternates with an extremely low reference 
point, conducive of mania; Gottschalk et al., 1995).
Early life might be particularly important in establish-
ing the learning rate, and early traumatic experience 
might be conducive of alterations of the learning rate 
(genetic factors might also be important). It is possible 
that whether early traumatic events produce excessively 
high or low learning rates (predisposing for bipolar 
disorder and depression, respectively) depends on the 
temporal pattern of these traumatic events. Experienc-
ing traumatic events all close in time would lead to the 
interpretation that the reference point µ can change 
abruptly, leading to a large learning rate and to a pre-
disposition for bipolar disorder. Conversely, experienc-
ing the same traumatic events but now sparse in time 
would lead to the interpretation that the reference point 
µ is rather fixed, leading to a small learning rate and 
to a predisposition for depression. This possibility fits 
with empirical observations showing that early trauma 
can predispose to either depression (Mandelli et  al., 
2015) or bipolar disorder (Aas et al., 2016). However, 
the influence of the traumatic temporal pattern advo-
cated here is a novel aspect that remains to be investi-
gated empirically. 
Moreover, traumas are associated not only with 
depression and bipolar disorder but also with other psy-
chopathologies such as addiction (S. H. Stewart, 1996) 
and borderline personality (Ball & Links, 2009). Learn-
ing rate alterations caused by traumas might be a factor 
in these conditions, too. Regarding addiction, an exces-
sively high learning rate might facilitate the develop-
ment of this disorder (explaining the link between 
addiction and bipolar disorder; Altamura, 2007), 
whereas an excessively low learning rate might inter-
fere with recovery once addiction has established 
(explaining the link between addiction and depression; 
Grant & Harford, 1995). Regarding borderline personal-
ity, traumatic experiences might also alter the learning 
rate, although not about the reference point but about 
the uncertainty parameter. This would result in an 
inability to adjust the uncertainty parameter when the 
contextual standard deviation changes, hence resulting 
in an abnormal uncertainty parameter (as examined 
above).
Arguably, parameters depend not only on direct 
experience with outcomes but also on social influence. 
For example, parents might teach their children that the 
top mark at school is the norm (Cook & Kearney, 2009, 
2014). This would lead their children to develop an 
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exaggerated reference point µ, facilitating perfectionism 
and dichotomous thinking or even depression. Further-
more, different parents might express their opinions 
about standards with varying degrees of confidence: 
Some parents might be absolutely sure about their stan-
dards, contrary to other parents expressing their stan-
dards cautiously. Opinions expressed with high 
confidence would lead children to develop high confi-
dence in their standards, too, reflected in small values 
of σ. Conversely, parents’ opinions expressed with low 
confidence would lead children to develop uncertainty 
about their standards, reflected in large values of σ.
Finally, certain drugs might affect the model param-
eters. Large evidence indicates that the neurotransmitter 
dopamine is central in evaluation (Wise, 2004). Consis-
tent with a role in reference-dependent evaluation, 
dopaminergic responses are tuned to expectations (Dab-
ney et al., 2020; Schultz et al., 1997; Tobler et al., 2005). 
Moreover, an association between behavioral reference 
effects and dopaminergic tuning has been reported 
(Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, et al., 
2016). This suggests that within the RDMP, drugs affect-
ing the dopaminergic system (including addictive 
drugs) might be interpreted as altering the reference 
point parameter. Serotonin is another neurotransmitter 
important in evaluation, and serotoninergic drugs are 
well-established treatments for depression (Hieronymus 
et al., 2018). Within the RDMP, the effect of these drugs 
might be interpreted as increasing the learning rate so 
that, after some new learning occurs, the reference 
point would decrease and adapt to the ongoing envi-
ronment. This implies that, once the learning rate is 
boosted by serotoninergic drugs, new learning is 
required for change to occur, in line with observations 
that serotoninergic drugs have delayed action (Michely 
et al., 2020).
In short, although the precise mechanisms respon-
sible for the development of the model parameters 
remain to be understood, four general factors can be 
advocated, comprising genetic influences, direct learn-
ing, social influence, and drug-related effects.
Discussion
Evaluation processes are critical in psychopathology, 
and reference effects are critical in evaluation (Louie 
et al., 2013, 2015; Koszegi & Rabin, 2006; Rigoli, 2019; 
Rigoli, Friston, et al., 2016; N. Stewart, 2009; N. Stewart 
et al., 2006; Woodford, 2012). Yet reference-dependent 
evaluation in psychopathology remains to be investi-
gated. In this article, we attempt to fill this gap by 
offering a computational model of evaluation processes 
in psychopathology grounded on reference depen-
dency. The advantage of this approach is threefold. 
First, it offers a mechanistic description of how evalu-
ation abilities might go awry and lead to mental illness. 
Second, it proposes a formal interpretation of standard 
concepts in the literature such as perfectionism, dichot-
omous thinking, and apathy. To date, these concepts 
have been usually described verbally; our model recasts 
these in computational terms, contributing to clearer 
and less ambiguous definitions. Third, the model pin-
points to the precise nature of the connections among 
concepts, for example between perfectionism and 
dichotomous thinking. So far, research has reported 
these connections at an empirical level, yet the nature 
of these connections has remained unclear at a theoreti-
cal level; the model offers a formal description of this 
nature.
Here we have examined the RDMP relative to a vari-
ety of phenomena across different clinical diagnoses. 
This raises the question of which phenomena can be 
fruitfully explored by the model. In other words, what 
is the potential scope of the RDMP? Contemporary theo-
ries maintain that reference dependency is at the core 
of evaluation, implying that the RDMP can potentially 
contribute to understand clinical conditions in which 
evaluation has gone awry, such as conditions character-
ized by abnormal motivation, emotion, and affect; a 
promising avenue is to apply the model to these. The 
RDMP appears as less relevant for clinical aspects in 
which evaluative processes are peripheral, such as hal-
lucinations, learning deficit, or dementia, to mention a 
few (although the model can still be useful to examine 
secondary affective processes ensuing from these 
aspects).
In presenting the RDMP, an implicit assumption has 
been that an individual represents a unique environ-
ment, described by one reference point and one uncer-
tainty parameter. However, representations of different 
contexts (each with its own parameter set) might coex-
ist in the brain, and the ongoing context might deter-
mine which representation is currently engaged. For 
example, an individual might represent the family con-
text as separated from the work context and activate 
the former at home and the latter in the workplace. An 
interesting research avenue is exploring the implica-
tions for psychopathology of having multiple context 
representations. Consider addiction: People affected by 
it might have a high reference point (proposed as 
underlying this disorder by the RDMP) only in some 
contexts (e.g., at a party) and not in others (e.g., at 
home). This implies drug craving in the first but not in 
the second context (i.e., at the party and not at home), 
allowing the RDMP to explain why some contexts can 
elicit drug craving even after prolonged abstinence: 
They would remain associated with a high reference 
point even when most other contexts are not anymore. 
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Potentially, this picture can contribute to integrating set-
point models (Koob, 1999; Koob & Le Moal, 2001, 2008; 
Sterling, 2012) with incentive-sensitization models of 
addiction (which emphasize how specific contexts 
boost drug value; Robinson & Berridge, 2001, 2008). 
Moreover, this has implications for interpreting recovery 
from addiction. Given that craving can arise even after 
prolonged abstinence, some have argued that, once 
established, addiction is irreversible (Volkow et  al., 
2016). Conversely, the RDMP suggests that, in principle, 
addiction can be fully counteracted (Heather et  al., 
2018) in as much as new learning can lower the refer-
ence point. However, assuming existence of multiple 
context representations, recovery would be complete 
only when new learning (and the ensuing lowering of 
the reference point) occurs for each context. As long 
as learning has not occurred in a context, the RDMP 
predicts that craving will ensue during exposure to that 
context.
Although this article focuses on the evaluation of 
external stimuli, the model applies equally to the evalu-
ation of interoceptive stimuli, such as visceral and car-
diac signals. The correct evaluation of interoceptive 
stimuli is considered to be crucial for adaptive regula-
tion, emotional processing, and conscious presence 
(Barrett, 2017; Craig, 2002; Iodice et  al., 2019; Seth 
et al., 2012). Conversely, the failure to correctly process 
and evaluate interoceptive stimuli may have psycho-
pathological consequences, such as the dysregulation 
of behavior observed in eating disorders or the aberrant 
interpretation of bodily stimuli observed in chronic pain 
(Barca & Pezzulo, 2020; Barrett et  al., 2016; Khalsa 
et al., 2018; Paulus et al., 2019). Establishing to what 
extent these and other psychopathological conditions 
could be explained within the model proposed here is 
an open objective for future research.
Although evaluation is pivotal in processes such as 
emotion, feeling, and motivation, it is not the only 
aspect involved in these processes. For example, aware-
ness about the own evaluation processes is likely to be 
critical (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). In other words, some 
individuals have poor understanding of why they evalu-
ate outcomes the way they do, whereas other individu-
als have substantial insight on this. The role of awareness 
is arguably important in many respects. A possibility is 
that awareness might foster strategies to develop more 
“healthy” model parameters, hence promoting adaptive 
evaluation. An intriguing possibility is that some of the 
beneficial effects of psychotherapy might be interpreted 
in this way—as promoting awareness of the patient’s 
evaluation process (and the associated model param-
eters) and as promoting the development of strategies 
to change this process (and hence the parameters; 
Papalini et al., 2020). Given this reasoning, a promising 
research avenue is to explore the role of awareness 
about evaluation processes, the impact of awareness in 
regulating the model parameters, and the role of psy-
chotherapy in promoting more healthy parameters via 
promoting awareness as well as via other strategies.
More generally, the RDMP can inspire process theo-
ries examining how treatments of mental illness work, 
thus contributing to improve these treatments. The 
effects of certain interventions can be interpreted, at 
least partially, as fostering more appropriate model 
parameters. For example, mindfulness has emerged as 
an effective intervention for a variety of clinical condi-
tions (Sauer et al., 2013). Within our model, by promot-
ing focus on and acceptance of the ongoing environment, 
mindfulness practices can be interpreted as strategies 
aimed at readapting the model parameters. An intrigu-
ing avenue is to adopt the RDMP as a framework for 
developing computational process theories of treat-
ments (i.e., theories in which the processes are exam-
ined at a computational level) such as mindfulness.
Finally, we stress potential future developments of 
the RDMP. First, whereas here we pursue a transdiag-
nostic approach encompassing phenomena common to 
various conditions, the model could be applied to 
develop profiles of each disorder. Second, although we 
suggest an important role for learning in shaping the 
model parameters, here we do not formally examine it; 
a detailed analysis of learning in the context of the 
RDMP is a promising research avenue. Third, it is 
important to explore the neural processes underlying 
abnormal model parameters and learning. Research has 
explored the neural aspects of certain mental illnesses, 
on the one hand, and of reference-dependent evalua-
tion, on the other; however, these two bodies of knowl-
edge remain to be integrated. Fourth, as discussed 
above, the RDMP can inspire computational process 
theories of treatments.
In summary, we propose a computational model of 
evaluation in psychopathology grounded on reference 
dependency. This offers a formal description of key 
processes underlying mental illness and a precise inter-
pretation of concepts (and of their links) developed by 
previous verbal theories.
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